Catholic University Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 1 Fall 2003

Article 3

2003

Domino Effect: The Continued Existence of Liability for Fraud in
Bankruptcy Despite Good-Faith Settlement by the Honestly
Unfortunate Settlor
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Theresa J. Radwan, Domino Effect: The Continued Existence of Liability for Fraud in Bankruptcy Despite
Good-Faith Settlement by the Honestly Unfortunate Settlor, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 81 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol53/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

DOMINO EFFECT: THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE
OF LIABILITY FOR FRAUD IN BANKRUPTCY
DESPITE GOOD-FAITH SETTLEMENT BY THE
HONESTLY UNFORTUNATE SETTLOR
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan'
"It is not true that men can be divided into absolutely honest
persons and absolutely dishonest ones. Our honesty varies with
the strain put on it."
-George Bernard Shaw1
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine three debtors, Adam, Brian, and Chris, each of whom finds
himself deeply in debt. For each, a significant portion of his debt
involves money due under a settlement agreement between the debtor
and a purchaser of the debtor's business. Shortly after buying the
business, the purchaser alleged that the debtor made fraudulent
misrepresentations regarding the client base of the business. Adam,
Brian, and Chris each proclaim the accuracy of his statements regarding
the business, claiming that the buyer misinterpreted those statements.
Although each intended to prove that assertion in court, when discovery
began, each debtor realized the time-consuming, expensive, and
unpredictable nature of litigation. Each chose settlement as the wisest
approach and agreed to pay the buyer $100,000, payable in twenty
monthly installments of $5,000 each.
When Adam entered into the agreement, he knew that he could never
make those payments, but nevertheless represented to the buyer that he
would pay those obligations in full and on time. The agreement
contained a provision expressly releasing Adam from any further claims
regarding the sale of the business. After paying $50,000, Adam filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.
' Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law. J.D., Order of the Coif, 1995,
College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The author thanks the
Stetson University College of Law for generously supporting this research, and the
College of Law's Faculty Support Services department for its assistance. In addition, this
article reflects the comments and contributions of many of her colleagues, including
Professors Michael Allen, Jennifer Anglim, Brooke Bowman, Michael Finch, Jamie Fox,
Richard Graves, Julian Kossow, Lizabeth Moody, and Timothy Reilly, as well as her
research assistant, Tiffany Dilorio.
1.
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Brian's agreement, like Adam's settlement, contained a provision
waiving all of the buyer's claims against Brian under the original
purchase agreement. However, unlike Adam, Brian entered into the
agreement believing that he could, indeed, make those payments. But,
after making ten payments, the poor economy took its toll on Brian. He
lost his job and saw his savings and retirement accounts dwindle away in
the stock market. Brian also filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.
Finally, Chris signed the agreement fully expecting to make all
payments due thereunder. Unfortunately, Chris also lost his job, his
savings, and his retirement funds due to the poor economy, and after
making $50,000 in payments on the settlement agreement, he filed for
bankruptcy protection. The agreement between Chris and his buyer
provided that the buyer could re-allege its fraud claims if Chris defaulted
on his obligations under the agreement.
For each of these three debtors, bankruptcy provides the hope of
starting over. Though bankruptcies present new challenges for debtors,
who must now face a world of reduced credit, they also provide an
opportunity for debtors to obtain a fresh start through the discharge2 of
debts not paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. But for each of them, a
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Archer v. Warner,
which provides that the amounts due under the settlement agreements
will continue post-bankruptcy if the creditor can prove the existence of
fraud, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the settlement, 3 limits
the debtor's ability to receive a fresh start.4 In rendering its decision, the
Court decided a question debated by the bankruptcy courts for nearly
half a century.5 The Court provided additional protections for creditors
to the detriment of debtors, such as Brian and Chris, who, in good faith,
tried to right their prior wrongs.6 This decision undermines the policies
and practicalities of settlements simply to prevent a debtor like Adam,
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000). A discharge renders prepetition judgments against
the debtor ineffective and prevents any creditor from seeking to collect against the debtor
on a prepetition claim. Id. Thus, the discharge allows the debtor to escape the confines of
indebtedness after making the required payments to creditors in the bankruptcy
proceeding. See id.
3.

Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003).

4. Id. The Court, however, cannot determine the dischargeability of such debts
unless the creditor owed the debt files a complaint alleging nondischargeability of the
claim. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a). That claim then instigates an adversary proceeding, in
which the court decides whether to discharge the amount due to the creditor. FED. R.

BANKR. P. 7001(6).
5. Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 389 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 1998); Howard B. Kleinberg, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Whether a Prepetition
Settlement Affects the Dischargeabilityof a Claim, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 381, 381-82
(2002).
6. Archer, 538 U.S. at 323.
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who enters into the settlement agreement specifically to discharge it in
Although Archer
bankruptcy, from receiving such a discharge.
effectively prevents debtors like Adam from receiving a discharge,7 the
Bankruptcy Code can prevent such creditors from receiving a discharge
without unduly burdening debtors that are honestly trying to resolve
8
prior disputes.

II. THE BASICS OF DISCHARGEABILITY
Persons or entities file for protection under the Bankruptcy Code for a
wide variety of reasons.9 Whatever the reason, the Bankruptcy Code
serves at least one major role in the debtor's life--to provide an orderly
means for repaying creditors. ° Rarely, if ever, can a debtor pay every
creditor the full amount owed.1" This situation then presents the problem
of what happens to the remaining unpaid debt. If a business liquidates
through a Chapter 7 proceeding, the business no longer exists. 12 Clearly,
then, the creditor can receive nothing more from the debtor than the
amount already paid." However, when the debtor continues to exist
post-bankruptcy, as either a living individual or a business that

7. Id.
8. See infra note 276 (recognizing the ability to hold fraudulently-incurred
settlement debt nondischargeable).
9. See Charles A. Docter, Impact of Credit Card Use on Consumer Bankruptcies,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 42 (discussing questionnaire of debtors from all over
the United States, regarding popular reasons for filing bankruptcy, including misuse of
credit cards, loss of employment, divorce, and unforeseen medical expenses).
10. See Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding
Dischargeabilityof Imputed FraudDebts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987, 987 n.2
(2003) (citing 1 COLLIER BANKR. MANUAL
1.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 3d ed. rev.
2002)).
11. See Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in
Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517, 519 n.14 (1996) (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, A General
Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311,
311 (noting payments of approximately thirty percent of unsecured creditors' claims));
Marcy J.K. Tiffany, Is Chapter 7 Cost Effective? Analysis of Trustee Distribution Statistics
in the Region 16 for Calendar Year 1996, 25 CAL. BANKR. J. 33, 33, 35 (1999) (indicating
that within Region 16, which encompasses the Central District of California, unsecured
creditors received on average less than 50% of their claim); William C. Whitford, The
Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and
Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994)
(noting that unsecured creditors receive nothing in many Chapter 7 cases).
12. 1 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2d § 18:8 n.1.
13. This does not mean, of course, that the creditor will receive nothing more on its
claim. The creditor may instead look to a surety, co-signor, partner, insurer, or other
responsible entity for payment of the remainder due. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000)
(explaining that the "discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any
other entity").
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reorganizes rather than liquidates, the means for repayment of the debt
continue. To hold the debtor liable for the remainder of the debt not
paid through the bankruptcy proceeding presents a difficult problem
because it places the debtor in exactly the same position as prior to the
bankruptcy filing. Time becomes the only benefit enjoyed by the debtor
as a result of filing for bankruptcy protection; the debtor manages to
enjoy time to pay off some debt without the pressures of lawsuits and
harassment by creditors. Particularly in the context of a Chapter 7
action, which typically lasts less than a year, 5 the relatively short time
period may not allow the debtor to find means to repay the remaining
debt, and the debtor will find himself back where he began. To give the
debtor more concrete benefits in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code
provides that a debtor who completes bankruptcy receives a discharge of
his debts not actually paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. 16 This discharge
allows a debtor to receive a "fresh start"' 7 after the conclusion of the
bankruptcy-the opportunity to begin again.
For obvious reasons, the fresh start is a concern to creditors who may
receive little, or none, of the amount due to them once the debtor files
for bankruptcy protection. To protect some of these creditors, Congress
enacted exceptions to the general rule of discharge of debts.' 8 At
present, nineteen specific exceptions exist to discharge of indebtedness,"
14. Other bankruptcies concerning family farms, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231, and
municipalities, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946, face the same possibilities, but will not be considered
herein given the relatively small number of filings by such entities. See Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record High-Again
(May 16, 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/bk302.pdf (reporting

that only 389 Chapter 12 cases were filed in 2002); National Bankruptcy Review
Commission,

Chapter

9:

Municipal

Bankruptcy

Relief,

available

at

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/22chapte.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (noting
the extremely small number of Chapter 9 filings).
15. Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of
Dischargeand Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 437 (1999)

(stating that most Chapter 7 proceedings typically last no longer than six months).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141(c), 1228(a), 1328(a) (2000).
17. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 527 U.S. 293 (2003) (asserting
that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a "fresh start"); Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start policy");
Boston Univ. v. Mehta (In re Mehta), 310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining the
delicate balance between a debtor's right to a fresh start and a creditor's need for
protection). See also WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2d § 48:1
("In fact, in most consumer Chapter 7 cases the prospect of the discharge of existing
liabilities is the major, if not the only, goal of the debtor."); Radwan, supra note 10, at 993
n.20 (noting wide acceptance of fresh start policy within bankruptcy).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000) (listing the exceptions to the general rule of discharge of
debts).

19.

Id.
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along with a number of grounds for denying discharge of all of the
debtor's unpaid debts. 0 Fraud provides but one of the reasons to exempt
a debt from discharge.2 ' Courts generally discharge contract debts unless
they fall within one of the grounds for nondischargeability. 22 Thus,
23
simply alleging that a contract debt exists will not prevent its discharge.
A. The Archer v. Warner Decision
Archer v. Warner24 stemmed from garden-variety, fraud-settlement
dischargeability facts.25 This issue arose when parties to a lawsuit alleging
fraud settled the claim without a judgment on the fraud and with no
mention in the settlement agreement of what should happen to the fraud
claim in the event of bankruptcy.26 Specifically, the Warners sold their
business, Warner Manufacturing, Inc., to the Archers.2 7 After the sale,
the Archers claimed that the Warners fraudulently induced them to
purchase the business. 28 The parties settled the fraud claims in 1995 for
20. Id. § 727(a). See also id. § 727(d) (allowing revocation of a discharge wrongfully
obtained); id. § 1141(d)(3)(C) (extending the general denial of discharge into Chapter 11);
id. § 1328(d) (denying discharge in Chapter 13 for debtors who fail to make minimum
payments).
21. Id. §§ 523(a)(2), (4).
22. See id. § 727(a) (stating that the court must grant the debtor a discharge unless
one of the exceptions in the Bankruptcy Code applies); see also NORTON, JR., supra note
17, § 47.59 ("Debt associated with a prepetition contract is discharged . . . absent a
statutory exception.").
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000).
24. 538 U.S. 314 (2003).
25. Id. at 316-17. The Court outlined the circumstances of the case:
(1) A sues B seeking money that (A says) B obtained through fraud; (2) the
parties settle the lawsuit and release related claims; (3) the settlement agreement
does not resolve the issue of fraud, but provides that B will pay A a fixed sum;
(4) B does not pay the fixed sum; (5) B enters bankruptcy; and (6) A claims that
B's obligation to pay the fixed settlement sum is nondischargeable because, like
the original debt, it is for "money... obtained by... fraud."
Id.
26. See id. at 317. Typically, a settlement agreement cannot serve as an admission of
liability absent an express indication of such liability. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408
(prohibiting use of settlement negotiations to prove liability in federal courts); Signature
Dev. Cos., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (prohibiting
use of settlement negotiations to prove liability under Colorado law) (citing Martin v.
Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 835 P.2d 505 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 855
P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1993)). Thus, because the creditor failed to establish fraud in the
underlying state court proceeding and the settlement agreement did not contain an
admission of fraud, the creditor must then prove fraud in the bankruptcy court in order to
establish nondischargeability. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 317-18.
27. Archer, 538 U.S. at 317.
28. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 233-35 (4th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538
U.S. 314 (2003); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
[hereinafter Brief for United States] at *2, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-
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$300,000; the Warners paid $200,000 immediately and signed a
promissory note to repay the remaining $100,000 within the next year."
The settlement agreement provided that the Archers released the
Warners from liability on the alleged fraud upon signing the agreement.30
Before making a single payment on the $100,000 due under the
promissory note, the Warners filed for bankruptcy protection.3 '
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the Archers and the Warners agreed
that the amount due to the Archers totaled $100,000.32
Leonard
accepted that he could not discharge the amount due to the Archers after
bankruptcy.33 Arlene, however, contended that she could discharge the
remainder due under the settlement agreement in bankruptcy because it
represented amounts due pursuant to a contract.34 The Archers
disagreed, arguing that even a contractual debt constitutes
nondischargeable fraud debt if the contract arose out of a fraud claim.
Although the Archers tried to amend their complaint in the bankruptcy
proceeding to include an allegation that the Warners fraudulently
induced them to enter into the settlement agreement, 36 the court
considered only the effect of the original fraud alleged in the sale of the
business.37

1418), available at 2002 WL 1836723; G. Ray Warner, Supreme Court to Decide Whether
Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Agreement Converts Non-dischargeable Debt into
Dischargeable Debt, at http://www.abiworld.org/archer.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).

Professor Warner (as distinguished from the debtors, Leonard and Arlene Warner)
concludes that the Archers lacked a strong case against Mrs. Warner in the original fraud
proceeding, based on the lower court's statement that the Mrs. Warner "denied any
misconduct and that the plaintiff's willingness to settle was based in part on numerous
defenses asserted by her." Id.
29. Brieffor the United States at *2, Archer (No. 01-1418). Unlike many cases, a lien
secured the $100,000 promissory note. In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 233-35. The court

neglected to reveal the nature or value of the collateral securing the loan, though it
indicated that the collateral included real estate. Id. at 235.
30. Archer, 538 U.S. 317. See also Bankruptcy--DischargeableDebts: Settlement of
Fraud Claims Creates Contract Debt Dischargeable in Bankruptcy, 70 U.S. L. WK. 1545,

1547 (Mar. 19, 2002) (discussing Archer: "Accompanying releases stated that the
purchasers 'release and forever discharge the . . . [Warners] from the beginning of the
world to the date of the release' for all liabilities arising from the state action.").
31.

Archer, 538 U.S. 317. Actually, the Warners failed to pay the first installment due

under the settlement agreement, and the Archers responded by filing a lawsuit based in
breach of contract, which prompted the Warners to file for bankruptcy. Id.
32. Id. at 317.
33. Id. at 318.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id.
Id.
Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 235 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id.
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The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the court of appeals all
agreed with Arlene Warner,3" finding that a contractual settlement that
releases the defendant from liability on the underlying fraud claim turns
the nondischargeable fraud debt into a dischargeable contract claim.39
The decision followed the reasoning of the Seventh 40 and Ninth 4 1 Circuits
in similar cases. 42 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit voiced concern that to
refuse discharge of such a debt would discourage a debtor from entering
into a settlement agreement because the debtor would know that he
43
could litigate the issue anyway if a bankruptcy ensues.
In his dissent, Judge Traxler noted the Supreme Court's long history of
dealing with fraud dischargeability issues.44 Judge Traxler argued that
precedent requires a denial of discharge for any debt linked to fraud:

Thus, the message delivered by a unanimous Supreme Court on
three separate occasions has been clear. In deciding cases
dealing with the fraud exceptions to dischargeability, courts
should effectuate congressional policy objectives by conducting
the fullest possible inquiry into the nature of the debt and
limiting relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor.
The Archers filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which the Court granted on June 24, 2002.46 The Court
heard the case on January 13, 20034' and rendered its decision in favor of
the Archers on March 31, 2003.4

38. Id. at 232.
39. Id. at 236.
40. In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994).
41. Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 127 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the agreement had created a
novation, which diminished all claims).
42. In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236. Although the courts call this a novation, the Fourth
Circuit recognized that the term "novation" typically involves a substitution of the parties
to contract, rather than the substitution of a contract claim for a tort claim. Id. at 236 n.8
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (7th ed. 1999)). See also, Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Alamo Ranch Co., 989 F.2d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1993) (defining elements of novation to
include "1) an existing and valid contract; 2) an agreement to the new contract by all the
parties; 3) a new valid contract; and 4) an extinguishment of the old contract by the new
one").
43. In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236.
44. Id. at 238-39 (J. Traxler, dissenting).
45. Id. at 239 (J. Traxler, dissenting).
46. Warner, supra note 28.
47. Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2002, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-calendars/monthlyargumentcal
january2003.pdf (last modified Nov. 14, 2002).
48. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 314 (2003).
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Concern over the potential effects of the Fourth Circuit's decision flow
throughout the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of the Archers. 49 For
example, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) noted
that "[a]dopting respondent's position in this case not only would expose
older Americans and other victims of fraud to greater risk of
nonrecovery, but would also have the adverse policy effect of
encouraging these victims to litigate their fraud cases to judgment, rather
than accepted negotiated resolutions."50 The United States also filed an
amicus brief, stating that "[t]he only settlements encouraged by the court
of appeals' decision are those induced by a desire to ensure that the
settlement debt may be discharged in bankruptcy, even where the debtor
actually committed fraud."51 Clearly, these organizations shared the
same concern expressed by Judge Traxler in his dissent-the concern
that innocent creditors will suffer at the hands of defrauding debtors.52
A divided Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit finding of
settlement debt as dischargeable.53 Although the majority discussed
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel extensively, the Court
ultimately left the lower courts to decide whether to apply these
concepts, noting that different states interpret the preclusive effect of a
settlement agreement differently.54 The majority focused on the prior
decisions noted by Judge Traxler in his dissent,55 finding that a
knowledgeable debtor's mere change in the form of a debt would not
56
render such debt dischargeable. In so determining, the Court focused
on prior decisions granting discharge only to "'honest, but unfortunate

49.

See generally Brieffor the United States, Archer (No. 01-1418); Brieffor AARP as

Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners [hereinafter Brief for AARP], Archer v. Warner,
538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418), availableat http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com!

supremescourt/briefs/01-1418/01-1418.mer.ami.aarp.pdf.
50.
51.
52.

Brieffor AARP at 6, Archer (No. 01-1418).
Brieffor the United States at *8, Archer (No. 01-1418).
See Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 239-40 (Traxler, J.,

dissenting).
53. Archer, 538 U.S. at 315, 323. Justice Thomas was joined in dissent by Justice
Stevens. Id. at 323.
54. Id. at 322-23 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 58 (1979)). See also
Rachel Marie Clark, Collateral Estoppel of Claim InterpretationAfter Markman, 86 MINN.

L. REV. 1581, 1603 (2002) (noting that settlements generally create a collateral estoppel
effect only if parties so intend) (citing Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000));
Carlos J. Cuevas, Collateral Estoppel and Dischargeability Proceedings: Part 11, AM.

BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2002, at 24 (stating that a consent judgment may invoke collateral
estoppel if the parties so intend) (citing Roeder v. Brown (In re Brown), 162 B.R. 17
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1993)).
55.
56.

See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 237.
Archer, 538 U.S. at 320-22 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)); In re

Warner, 283 F.3d at 237 (J. Traxler, dissenting).
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debtor[s].' 57 Even though the fraud did not arise in preparation of the
settlement contract, the Court decided that a debtor who commits fraud
can never erase the dishonesty of that original fraud5 8 Thus, even a
good-faith settlement resolving the fraud issue would not suffice, because
the fraud brands the subsequent debt.59
In making its decision, the Court also examined the evolution of the
language of section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.60 Section
523(a)(2)(A) mirrors section 17a of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.61
Originally, the fraud discharge exception required a judgment of fraud
liability in order to find nondischargeability. 62 The Court reasoned that
the elimination of the judgment requirement in favor of a "liability"
requirement indicated that settlements of fraud allegations, as debts
"'arising out of' fraud,"' fell into the exception to discharge, provided
that the creditor. could actually prove fraud. 63 The Archer Court,
however, merely created the possibility for a denial of discharge,
remanding the case for a determination on the underlying fraud
allegations. 64
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Thomas considered the paradox of using
the underlying fraud to determine dischargeability, while using the
settlement agreement to determine the amount of liability for that
nondischargeable fraud.65 It provides an inconsistent result to prohibit

discharge of a fraud debt in order to punish dishonest debtors,
while only
66
providing the defrauded creditor the settled-upon amount.
The Supreme Court's reliance on a statement in Brown v. Felsen1
demonstrates its underlying fear of dishonest debtors: "the mere fact that
a conscientious creditor has previously reduced his claim to judgment

57.

In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 237 (J. Traxler, dissenting) (citing Grogan v. Garner,

498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).
58. Archer, 538 U.S. at 322-23.
59. See id. The Court did not determine the enforceability of an express statement
rendering the settlement debt dischargeable in the event of bankruptcy. But see Warner,
supra note 28 (stating that Supreme Court's decision would invalidate such a provision).
60. Archer, 538 U.S. at 320-23; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
61. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000), with Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §
17a(2), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17a(2), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); Archer,
538 U.S. at 320-21.
63. Archer, 538 U.S. at 320-21 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979);
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213,215 (1998)).

64. Id. at 322. The Archer Court merely created the possibility of a denial of
discharge, remanding the case for a determination on the underlying fraud allegations. Id.
65. Id. at 325-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. See id.
67. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
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should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the debt." 68 The

Court fears that a debtor might fraudulently incur debt, enter into a
settlement agreement solely to convert that debt into dischargeable
contract debt, and indeed follow through with a bankruptcy filing seeking
a discharge of the settlement debt.69
B. The Circuit Court Split
The vast majority of bankruptcy and district court cases considering
the issue of discharge of settled fraud claims, prior to Archer, held
settlement debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy, so long as the creditor
could prove that fraud actually occurred. 70 However, the Circuit Courts

68. Archer, 538 U.S. at 320-21 (citing Brown, 442 U.S. at 138).
69. The same fear evidences itself in various cases predating Archer, as well as in the
opinions of legal scholars:
Prior to the bankruptcy, the debtor reduced the controversy over its alleged
misfeasance to a stipulated amount .... [Olne would think that such a dishonest
debtor would not be able to hide behind the shield of bankruptcy, let alone wield
it as a sword ....
But this is not always happening. In a startling turn of events,
certain high appellate courts are condoning the unscrupulous actions of
wrongdoers, and permitting them to exercise the normal prerogatives of
bankruptcy to erase debts obtained by fraud, merely by the happenstance that
the underlying controversies were reduced to settled amounts.
. . . Fulfilling this tribunal's mandate only serves to allow, in fact encourage,
miscreant debtors to settle, and then promptly file for bankruptcy, secure in the
knowledge
they have
succeeded
in transmogrifying
an originally
nondischargeable debt into a standard contract claim capable of eradication.
Anthony Michael
Sabino, Preventing an Alchemy of Evil: Preserving the
Nondischargeability of a Debt Obtained by Fraud, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 99, 100, 144
(2003); see also United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Settlement
makes the dishonest debtor no more honest, and no more entitled to the relief Congress
intended to reserve for the honest debtor."); Greenberg v. Schs., 711 F.2d 152, 154 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("Appellee['s interpretation] would allow a debtor to discharge a debt incurred
by his own fraud by simply entering into a settlement agreement ....
The debtor could
even accept a substantially adverse settlement [knowing] that its terms . . . would be
nullified by the subsequent petition in bankruptcy."); Haynes v. Bobofchak (In re
Bobofchak), 101 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) ("The intent of Congress to except
from discharge debts incurred by means of fraud or defalcation could effectively be shortcircuited by a simple execution of settlement."); Kleinberg, supra note 5, at 390 ("[T]here
would seem to be no reason the mere fact that a conscientious creditor has previously
reduced its claim to settlement should bar ... an inquiry [into fraud]."); David Zelikoff,
Fraud by Any Other Name Is Still Fraud: Settling a Potential Fraud Claim Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 866, 874 (1996) ("The fraudulent debtor
cannot escape liability by using the Bankruptcy Code to his advantage ... ").
70. E.g., Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 266 B.R. 282, 286 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2001), affd 326 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
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of Appeal divided more evenly. The Second,71 Eleventh,72 and D.C.73
Circuits, as well as the Sixth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel,74
agreed that debtors could not discharge settled fraud claims, while the
Fourth,75 Seventh,76 and Ninth" Circuits allowed such a discharge, despite
proof of the underlying fraud .
1. Cases ProhibitingDischarge
With its decision in Greenberg v. Schools,79 the Eleventh Circuit

became the first circuit court to hold that a debtor could not
automatically discharge amounts due under a settlement agreement in
bankruptcy. 8° Basing its analysis on a 1939 embezzlement case, the court
held that a settlement cannot change the character of an underlying
debt.81 Although the court found legal support for its conclusion, it
focused primarily on policy concerns:
71. Giaimo, 326 F.3d at 320.
72. Fuller v. Johannessen (In re Johannessen), 76 F.3d 347, 350 (11th Cir. 1996);
Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156.
73. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1161.
74. Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 385-86 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 1998).
75. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.2d 230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2001).
76. In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994).
77. Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer, 116 F.3d 388, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1997).
78. The Tenth Circuit came close to rendering a decision on the issue in Arnold v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, in which the court held that a promissory note evidencing a
fraud debt did not substitute a contract claim for a tort claim, and denied discharge. 465
F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1972). The issue in Arnold differs from that of Archer in two
significant ways. Id. at 356. First, the debtor in Arnold admitted to the fraud. Id. Second,
the note did not settle the fraud liability; rather, it simply documented the debtor's
willingness to voluntarily repay his fraud debt. Id. Such a situation truly would elevate
"form over substance" and defeat Congress's intent in enacting § 523. See Rodriguez v.
Valencia (In re Valencia), 280 B.R. 520, 521-22 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002) (noting the lack of
a Tenth Circuit decision with regard to settlement agreements, but stating that such a
discharge would "elevate form over substance"). Although it has not decided the issue,
the Third Circuit has held that, generally, the Bankruptcy Code cannot turn a settlement
agreement from a contract into something noncontractual:
Generally, application of the Bankruptcy Code does not change the attributes of
a given legal relationship. Thus, if the settlement agreement should be
considered a contract under relevant nonbankruptcy law, it will be a contract in
bankruptcy "[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result" .. ..
Although settlement agreements may be judicially approved, they share many
characteristics of voluntary contracts ....
Enter. Energy Corp. v. United States (In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.), 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d
Cir. 1995) (considering whether a settlement agreement constitutes an executory contract
(citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
79. Greenberg v. Schs., 711 F.2d 152 (11th Cir. 1983).
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id. at 155-56.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:81

The interpretation urged by the appellee would allow a debtor
to discharge a debt incurred by his own fraud by simply entering
into a settlement agreement prior to declaring bankruptcy. The
debtor could even accept a substantially adverse settlement with
the knowledge that its terms and conditions would be nullified
by the subsequent petition in bankruptcy. 82
The court then determined that the debt "unquestionably [arose as]
the result of the debtor's fraud," and refused discharge.8 3 Thus, the8
existence of fraud tainted all indebtedness resulting from that fraud.
Like its finding in Archer, the Greenberg Court found that, although the
debt resulted from fraud, the nondischargeable claim could not exceed
the settled-upon amount of damages." Interestingly, the court failed to
mention the existence of a release within the settlement agreement. 86
However, the court's ultimate decision that fraud continued despite the
existence of a settlement agreement implicitly rendered the existence of
such a release irrelevant.
Agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in United States v. Spicer,87 held that a debtor
cannot discharge a settlement agreement of a fraud claim once the
creditor proves the underlying fraud. 8 The settlement contract at issue89
in Spicer contained an express waiver of the underlying fraud claim.
The Spicer case arose out of the debtor's admittedly false statements
made to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).9 °
Noting that most other courts followed the Greenberg decision,9 the
court held that "a fraudulent debtor remains a fraudulent debtor, and
debt originating in fraud remains nondischargeable even if its legal form
changes under a settlement agreement." 92 The court rejected cases
allowing discharge without a determination of fraud because such cases
"elevat[e] legal form over substance."93 Because the debtor admitted the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 154.
Id. at 156.
See id.
Id. at 153 (noting that the claim arises out of the settlement agreement).
See id. at 152.
57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1154.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1155.
92. Id. at 1157.
93. Id. at 1155. The concern of form versus substance applies both in the context of
granting a discharge and of denying a discharge. NORTON, supra note 17, at § 48:1 ("A
liberal construction of the statutory requirements for discharge means that discharge
should be denied only for real and substantial reasons, not on technical grounds.").
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falsity of the statements made to HUD, the court held that fraud did
refused to discharge the resulting settlement
indeed exist,
94 and therefore
agreement.
95
a decision rendered just weeks after the
In Giaimo v. Detrano,
Supreme Court's decision in Archer, the Second Circuit agreed that a
debtor could not receive discharge of a settlement of a fraud claim simply
because the claim now existed as a contract.96 Unlike Greenberg and
Spicer, Giaimo involved embezzlement claims. 97 Like the Spicer case,
however, the settlement agreement included an express release of the
debtor on the alleged embezzlement. 9s The Second Circuit began with a
discussion of res judicata principles, but found that, without a judgment
on the embezzlement claim, res judicata could not apply. 99 The court
then turned its attention to the argument that the contractual settlement
was a substitute for the original tort claim.1°° In finding that the
bankruptcy court must consider whether the embezzlement actually
occurred, the court of appeals decided that "reducing a fraud claim to
settlement [does] not change the nature of the debt for dischargeability

purposes."1 1
The Greenberg, Spicer, and Giaimo cases express one clear concern
that is shared by the Supreme Court. The judges worry that debtors will
use the contractual nature of a settlement agreement to escape
obligations for fraudulent behavior at the expense of innocent
creditors. '°2 Each court determines, in its own way, that the substance of
the original fraud claim remains alive forever, regardless of the efforts or
intent of the parties to change the fraud debt into a different type of
claim.103

In Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis,'°4 the Sixth Circuit's Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel outlined additional reasons for denying discharge of
fraud settlement claims when creditors demonstrate fraud.05 Although
the Francis case involved the question of whether to discharge a
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1154, 1161.
Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 326 F.3d 319 (2d. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 320-21.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 322.
See id.; United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Greenberg v.

Schs., 711 F.2d 152, 154 (11th Cir. 1983).
103. See supra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
104. Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
1998).
105. Id. at 390-91.

94
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settlement agreement based in fraud, the debtor in Francis actually
admitted to the alleged fraud. ' 6 Thus, the court only needed to
determine whether the settlement agreement served to substitute a
contract claim for the fraud claim' 7 If the court answered that inquiry in
the affirmative, then the debtor received a discharge.
If the court
answered in the negative, however, the debtor lost the possibility of
discharge because the fraud clearly existed.'09
Refusing discharge of the settlement agreement, 110 the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel first looked to cases finding the opposite result."'
Specifically, the court noted that Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing,"'
upon which many other cases relied, only allowed a settlement
agreement to replace a tort claim to the extent intended by the parties."'
The court argued that cases following Maryland Casualty misconstrued
its holding to allow settlement agreements to replace nondischargeable
tort claims under any circumstances." 4 However, rather than returning
to Maryland Casualty's intent-of-the-parties standard, the Francis court
landed at the other extreme. The court failed to consider the intent of
the parties, instead considering only the underlying cause of action
settled by the contract, and the ability to prove the elements of that cause
of action."5
Second, the Panel noted that the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to
116
waive his right to discharge only after the bankruptcy begins, and
caselaw prohibits the debtor from waiving the right to file for bankruptcy
protection. "' Although the court failed to explain the connection
between these two concepts and denying discharge on a settlement claim
106. Id. at 387.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 384-90 (quoting Md. Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257, 258-59 (7th Cir.
1948)). The court reiterated, "if it is shown that the note... is given ... as payment. . . of
the tort action ... [the debt] is fully satisfied." Id.; See also Elizabeth Warren & Jay L.
Westbrook, Settling into Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2003) (discussing
novation as substitution of a contract claim for a tort claim and the resulting ability to
discharge).
109. Francis,226 B.R. at 385-86 (noting the finding of the Bankruptcy Court that "due
to several prior court decisions, collateral estoppel barred Francis from relitigating ...
fraud," and finding no novation and no discharge).
110. Id. at 392-93.
111. Id. at 389-90.
112. 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1948).
113. Francis,226 B.R. at 389-90.
114. Id. at 390.
115. Id. at 389-92.
116. Id. at 390 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) (2000)).
117. Id. (referring to Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 222 B.R. 682, 685, 687
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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based in fraud, presumably, the court believed that the concepts implied
a Code policy disfavoring pre-bankruptcy changes to the form of a claim.
Essentially, given that a debtor cannot waive discharge, to allow the
debtor to use a contract settlement to create a right to discharge would
lead to an injustice.
Third, the Francis court correctly indicates that courts prefer
settlement agreements to litigation" 8 and that discharge of a settlement
claim might discourage a creditor from settling a fraud claim." 9 This
notion becomes particularly important when entering into a settlement
agreement with a debtor on the brink of financial ruin. 12 A creditor,
aware of the precarious financial position of the debtor, may find the risk
of bankruptcy
and subsequent discharge too great, and decide against
2
settlement. 1
Finally, the Francis court found that the language of section
523(a)(2)(A) "plainly" indicates that a settlement agreement does not
terminate the fraud underlying the settlement and that, discharge must
be denied once the creditor proves fraud. 122 The Francis court's logic
mirrored that of the Supreme Court, finding that the statute's language
prohibiting discharge of a debt, "to the extent" that a debtor fraudulently
obtains money, indicated Congress's desire to continue the liability of a
dishonest debtor. 23
Judge Lundin dissented from the Francis ruling, relying upon an Ohio
law providing that courts must uphold a release contained within a
settlement agreement absent clear and convincing evidence that the
parties mistakenly entered into the settlement. 24 Because the creditor
failed to provide such evidence, Judge Lundin argued, the court must
enforce the release terminating the fraud liability.'2 In addition, Judge
Lundin noted that Congress limited a debtor's ability to substitute
126
dischargeable debt for nondischargeable debt in a related situation.
118. Id. at 390; see also 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 5 (2000)
("Public policy favors the resolution of controversies and uncertainties through
compromise and settlement rather than through litigation, and it is the policy of the law to
uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made and are not in contravention of
some law or public policy. Settlement agreements are encouraged by courts.").
119. Francis,226 B.R. at 390; see also Zelikoff, supra note 69, at 874 (arguing that the
Spicer decision allows creditors to settle claims without regard to dischargeability and,
thus, encourages creditors to settle claims).
120. Francis,226 B.R. at 390.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 391.
123.

Id.

124.
125.
126.

Id. at 394 (Lundin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 396.
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Section 523(a)(14) of the Bankruptcy Code denies discharge of debt
incurred to pay a nondischargeable tax debt. 127 If Congress wished to
create such a rule prohibiting the exchange of a dischargeable debt for
nondischargeable fraud debt, it certainly could do so, but the creation of
such a rule is not within the judiciary's power.128
127. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) (2000). Another provision of the Code, added after the
Francis decision, also prohibits substitution of dischargeable debt for nondischargeable
debt, in the context of settlement agreements. The Corporate Fraud Accountability Act
of 2002, H.R. 5118, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted), added new subsection (19) to § 523(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, refusing discharge of a debt if it:
(A) is a claim for(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that term is defined
in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any state
securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under such Federal or State
securities laws; or
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security; and
(B) results, in relation to any claim described in subparagraph (A), from-(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or
State judicial or administrative proceeding;
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty,
citation, restitutionary payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost or
other payment owed by the debtor.
Id. (emphasis added). See G. Ray Warner, Accounting Reform Law Adds Broad Securities
Fraud Discharge Exception, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6, 43 (2002) (arguing that the Act
makes significant additions to § 523(a) by including violations of state and federal
securities laws to the class of nondischargeable debts, regardless of fraudulent intent).
Both sides of the fraud-settlement dischargeability debate will benefit from the addition of
this subsection. Id. For favoring discharge of settlement debt, the Corporate Fraud
Accountability Act indicates that Congress included an express statement of settlement
agreement nondischargeability because nondischargeability of debt incurred by a violation
of federal securities law or fraud involving a securities law did not automatically extend to
settlement agreements. Id. Under Archer's reasoning, the statute (which preceded
Archer, but was not cited therein) would not need to extend nondischargeability to
settlement agreements, at least those arising out of "common law fraud, deceit or
manipulation" because the denial of discharge for securities fraud debt would cover such
settlement agreements. Id. For the other side of the debate, the statute strengthens
Congressional resolve to punish dishonest debtors, regardless of the form of indebtedness.
Sabino, supra note 69, at 148. Rather than creating a new rule, the new statute merely
clarifies Congressional intent regarding settlement agreements. See id.
128. Francis,226 B.R. at 396 (Lundin, J., dissenting). Although the tax statute lends
some credibility to Judge Lundin's argument, one problem remains: The tax
nondischargeability statute, which refuses discharge for "any debt . . . for a tax or a
customs duty," differs significantly from the fraud nondischargeability statute, which
prohibits discharge for "any debt ...

for money ...

to the extent obtained by ...

fraud."

Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2000) (tax nondischargeability statute), with 11 U.S.C
§ 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (fraud nondischargeability statute). Given the Cohen Court's focus
on the "to the extent obtained by" language of § 523(a)(2) as indicating that
nondischargeability applies to both fraud debt and any debt following from the original
fraud, the fact that the tax statute lacks such language could explain the need for an
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2. Cases Permitting Discharge
The original case permitting discharge of a contract based in fraud,
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, arose in 1948.129 Like so many other
fraud cases, Maryland Casualty involved a debtor who embezzled from
his employer. 13 The debtor executed a promissory note to his employer
for the amount embezzled, in exchange for a promise that the employer
would dismiss the claims brought against the debtor-employee in state
court.
Of course, the employee then filed for bankruptcy protection
and sought to discharge the obligations under the promissory note. 132
While recognizing that typically "a promissory note is but the evidence of
indebtedness and does not discharge the debt for which it was given," the
court held that, in this case, the parties intended that the promissory note
would substitute a contract debt for the embezzlement debt because it
expressly waived the underlying tort claim. 3 3 Although frequently cited
by later courts in the settlement agreement context, 114 Maryland Casualty
involved a promissory note evidencing indebtedness and, essentially,
admitting liability for the underlying tort. 135 Subsequent cases involved
actual negotiations between the parties regarding the amount of damages
and, typically, 136
releasing the defendant-debtor from liability for the
underlying tort.

additional provision prohibiting substitution of a nondischargeable debt for the tax debt.
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218-19 (1998). However, a number of cases interpret
Cohen to encompass other provisions (including § 523(a)(1)) in its coverage. See, e.g.,
Rousses v. Michaelides (In re Roussos), 251 B.R. 86, 94 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000); CSC
Holdings, Inc. v. Feiner (In re Feiner), 254 B.R. 266, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000); Gentry
v. Kovler (In re Kovler), 249 B.R. 238, 259-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
129. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1948).
130. Id. at 258.
131. Id. at 258-59.
132. Id. at 258.
133. Id. at 258-59. Other courts adopted the same standard outside of the fraud
context in determining whether a settlement claim can serve as a dischargeable contract
claim. See In re Anderson, 64 B.R. 311, 334-35 (1986) (holding that, where a defendant
admitted liability for lost funds and signed a promissory note to repay debt, the note
substituted for the original tort claim in light of the parties' intentions).
134. In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1994).
135. Maryland Casualty, 171 F.2d at 258.
136. Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1977);
West, 22 F.3d at 777.
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In In re West,"' the court again dealt with embezzlement claims. 38 The39
settlement agreement specifically released the debtor from liability.'
The court held that, because the language specifically released the
embezzlement claim in favor of the settlement obligation, the underlying
fraud did not make the settlement agreement nondischargeable.'4 Thus,
type of "plain language"-the plain
the Court focused on a different
4
language of the contract itself.' '
Following the precedent set by West, the In re Fisher decision of the
Ninth Circuit held that the settlement of a fraud claim becomes a
dischargeable debt in bankruptcy. 42 The Fischercourt limited its finding
to instances where the settlement agreement clearly released the debtor

137. 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1994).
138. The nondischargeability of debt for embezzlement stems from 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4), which denies discharge for "any debt ... for fraud or defalcation while acting
in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2000).
Interestingly, the "to the extent obtained by" language found in § 523(a) does not appear
in this section. Id. The cases finding settlement agreements nondischargeable focus on
the "to the extent obtained by" language as one of the reasons why the fraud continues to
taint the settlement obligation. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. See also,
supra note 127.
139. West, 22 F.3d at 777. Although the West court indicated that such a release rarely
occurs, many of the settlement agreements dealt with in these cases expressly waived
liability for the underlying cause of action as part of the settlement agreement. See, e.g.,
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003) (requiring execution of releases after signing
an agreement); Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 266 B.R. 282, 282 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2001) (requiring execution of releases within thirty days of signing an agreement); Lundy
v. Atlas (In re Atlas), 1999 WL 496464, at *34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 7, 1999) (releasing
claims upon signing of an agreement); United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1154 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (waiving claims upon signing of an agreement); Fed. Sign v. Fultz (In re Fultz),
232 B.R. 709, 714 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1999) (waiving claims upon signing of an agreement).
140. West, 22 F.3d at 777. The court also sharply criticized the creditor for interpreting
the Greenbergcase as expressly rejecting the holding of the Maryland Casualty case:
[The creditor's] brief leads the reader to conclude that many courts, including the
Eleventh Circuit in Greenberg v. Schools, have considered both prongs of the
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing rule and expressly rejected them, occasionally
with direct criticism. As discussed in the previous section, we read the cases
much differently. To argue for an extension of case law or for abandonment of
certain common law principles is permissible advocacy; to tell a court that other
courts have rejected (as distinct from undermined) a common rule is
sanctionable if untrue. Nonetheless, [the creditor] argues no more than the
holding of In re Spicer. While we are neither bound nor persuaded by the Spicer
decision, we do not believe it is sanctionable to press one court to adopt
another's holding.
Id. at 779 (citations omitted).
141. See id. at 778.
142. Key Bar Invs. v. Fischer (In re Fisher), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1997).
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from liability
for the underlying fraud (or embezzlement) that allegedly
43
occurred. 1
C. Supreme Court FraudDischargeabilityDecisions

Although Archer provided the first opportunity for the Supreme Court
to consider the dischargeability of amounts due pursuant to settlement
agreements of fraud claims, the Court has considered fraud
dischargeability on a number of occasions over the last twenty-five
years."' On balance, these decisions tend to favor
protecting innocent
145
creditors over providing a fresh start for debtors.
In Brown v. Felsen,146 a case frequently cited by courts refusing to
discharge settlement debt, 147 a creditor sued the debtor in state court
alleging fraud. 148 The parties agreed to a consent judgment on the fraud
claim. 4 1 When the debtor filed bankruptcy, the creditor alleged that the
debtor could not discharge the debt under the consent judgment because
it resulted from fraud."5 The debtor attempted to invoke res judicata
principles, stating that, because the creditor relinquished the opportunity
to litigate the fraud issue in state court, the creditor could not now

143. See id. at 390-91. Although it noted that the fraud victim (the creditor) actually
drafted the release language, the court did not focus on the identity of the drafter as
determinative of dischargeability. See id. Interestingly, the contract also waived a
provision of California law that provided that a victim of fraud could sue for unknown
fraud claims even after signing the settlement agreement. Id. at 390.
144. See Kleinberg, supra note 5, at 387-89 (discussing pre-Archer cases in which the
Supreme Court considered fraud dischargeability).
145. One interpretation of these cases requires that the fraud discharge exception
receive a broad construction, almost inevitably favoring the creditor's interests over those
of the debtor:
The message delivered by the Supreme Court on these occasions has been clear.
In deciding cases dealing with the fraud exceptions to dischargeability, courts
should effectuate congressional policy objectives by conducting the fullest
possible inquiry into the nature of the debt and limiting relief to the honest but
unfortunate debtor ....
Given that the Supreme Court has declared that "the
mere fact that a conscientious creditor has previously reduced his claim to
judgment should not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the debt," there
would seem to be no reason the mere fact that a conscientious creditor has
previously reduced its claim to settlement should bar such an inquiry.
Kleinberg, supra note 5, at 389-90.
146. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
147. See, e.g., Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 318-22 (2003); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v.
Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 392 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998); Citizens Ins. Co. v.
Williams, No. 93-CV-74258-DT, 1994 WL 930884, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 31, 1994).
148. Brown, 442 U.S. at 128.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 129.
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litigate the issue in federal bankruptcy court.15' In a unanimous decision,
the Supreme Court held that res judicata principles did not apply; and the
bankruptcy court could consider potential fraud underlying the consent
judgment to determine dischargeability of the amounts due to the
creditor.1 2 In response to the debtor's argument that the lower court
already had determined whether he committed fraud, the Court replied:
By seeking discharge, however, respondent placed the rectitude
of his prior dealings squarely in issue, for, as the Court has
noted, the [Bankruptcy] Act limits that opportunity to the
"honest but unfortunate debtor." . . . Section 17a, the focus of
this case, provides that certain types of debts are not affected by
a discharge. These include, under § 17a(2), "liabilities for
obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false
representations . . . or for willful and malicious conversion of
the property of another" and, under § 17a(4), debts that "were
created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity.153
Further, the Court classified the creditor's use of fraud as a defense
against the debtor's claim of dischargeability. 5 4 Thus, the Court
concluded that the creditor had rightfully attempted to defend his claim,
and had not alleged a fraud cause of action against the debtor.'
Following the Brown decision, which permitted courts to determine
fraud underlying consent judgments, the Court next considered what
standard to apply in determining the existence of such fraud in Grogan v.
56 The debtor in Grogan sought to discharge a fraud judgment
Garner.'
In
from a jury trial in federal district court by declaring bankruptcy.'
the district court proceeding, the creditor proved fraud by a
The debtor argued that, although a
preponderance of the evidence.
preponderance of the evidence sufficed to establish fraud at the jury trial,
the Bankruptcy Code required a showing of fraud by clear and
convincing evidence to deny discharge. 9 Both the Bankruptcy Court
and the district court disagreed, noting that to require the creditor to
reestablish fraud in the bankruptcy proceedings:
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 133.
Id.
498 U.S. 279, 281 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 282.
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[W]ould [ ] permit the party who loses at a jury trial to have a
second day in court on the same issue [on which] he and his
opponent were fully heard previously. If permitted, all like
cases would result in duplicitous litigation 160resulting in an

unreasonable burden on the bankruptcy court.

The Court considered two options - defer to state law to determine the
burden of proof, or create a uniform burden of proof to determine fraud
dischargeability.1 6 1 In unanimously choosing the latter option, the Court
held that the role of the Bankruptcy Court rests not so much in
determining the existence of state-law fraud, but in determining the
dischargeability of that fraud. 162 To determine dischargeability, the Court
found that the creditor need only prove fraud by a preponderance of the
evidence. ' To hold otherwise would unduly burden the 64creditor-the
victim of fraud -and unfairly benefit the dishonest debtor.'
161

In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court determined whether, and to
what extent,
a "creditor must
rely on a fraudulent misrepresentation to
estalish
.. 166
Although the debtor argued for a
establish nondischargeability.
"reasonable reliance" standard, matching the express requirement for

showing nondischargeable fraud under section 523(a)(2)(B),'67 the Court
opted for the less-demanding, and more creditor-friendly standard of
"justifiable reliance." 16

160. Id. at 282 n.4 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a).
161. Id. at 283-84.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 286-87.
164. Id. at 291.
165. 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
166. Id. at 61.
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2000). Section 523(a)(2)(B) deals with written
fraud regarding the financial condition of the debtor or an insider of the debtor. Id.
§ 523(a)(2)(B)(ii). The statute specifically requires that the creditor reasonably rely upon
the misrepresentation. Id.
168. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 73-75 (1995). The concurrence also noted that a
causation issue remained for the lower courts:
Was the debt in question, as the statute expressly requires, "obtained by" the
alleged fraud? ... Mans ultimately urges that the promissory note to the Fields
is, in any event, a dischargeable debt because it was not "obtained by" the
allegedly fraudulent letters Mans's attorney wrote to the Fields' attorney months
after the debt was incurred. The Fields maintain that they relied on the letters to
their detriment, in effect according Mans an extension of credit instead of
invoking the due-on-sale clause.
It bears consideration whether a debt that would have been dischargeable had
the debtor simply transferred the property, in violation of the due-on-sale clause
with never a word to the creditor, nonetheless should survive bankruptcy
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Finally, in Cohen v. de la Cruz,"6 9 the Court favored creditors by

expanding the damages held nondischargeable under section
523(a)(2)(A) to include punitive damages.17 ° In Cohen, a landlord
fraudulently obtained money from tenants in violation of local law. 17'
When the tenants sued the landlord, the court ordered the landlord 1to2
return the fraudulently-obtained funds and to pay punitive damages.
The landlord then filed for bankruptcy protection, and admitted that he
could not discharge the portion
S
173 of the judgment requiring return of the
fraudulently-obtained funds.
However, the landlord argued for
discharge of the punitive damages because he did not obtain those funds
through fraud. 174 The Court unanimously disagreed, relying on the
Bankruptcy Code's policy of protecting honest debtors, not dishonest
ones.7 7 The Court reasoned that the punitive damages resulted from the
fraud:
The most straightforward reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is that it
prevents discharge of "any debt" respecting "money, property,
services, or

.

.

.

credit" that the debtor has fraudulently

obtained, including treble damages assessed on account of the
fraud ....
Moreover, the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in §
523(a)(2)(A), as the court of appeals recognized, does not
impose any limitation on the extent to which "any debt" arising
from fraud is excepted from discharge. "[T]o the extent
obtained by" modifies "money, property, services, or... credit"
-not "any debt"-so that the exception encompasses "any debt.
.for money, property, services, or... credit, to the extent [that
the money, property, services, or . . . credit is] obtained by"

fraud. The phrase thereby makes clear that the share of money,
property, etc., that is obtained by fraud gives rise to a
nondischargeable debt. Once it is established that specific

because the debtor wrote to the creditor of the prospect, albeit not the actuality
of the transfer.
Id. at 78-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
169. 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
170. Id. at 215.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 215-16.
173. Id. at 219.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 217-18. See also Bankruptcy-DischargeableDebts: Punitive Damages
Flowing From Fraud Cannot Be Discharged in Bankruptcy, 66 U.S.L.W. 1579 (1998)
(summarizing Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998)).
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money or property has been obtained by fraud, 1however,
"any
76
debt" arising therefrom is excepted from discharge.
The Court also noted the legislative history surrounding the enactment
of section 523(a)(2)(A)."' The fraud discharge exception under the
former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 required an actual judgment of fraud,
and according to the Court, this exception would extend to punitive
damages included within such a judgment. 78 Because the Bankruptcy
Code expanded the 1898 Bankruptcy79 Act provisions, the new legislation
likewise included punitive damages.
The Grogan, Field, and Cohen decisions illustrate the Supreme Court's
central concerns in dealing with fraud dischargeability: punishment of
dishonest debtors and protection of innocent creditors 8 Grogan sets
the most lenient standard possible for a creditor trying to establish
fraud.' " Field, while requiring reliance on a misrepresentation to prove
fraud, only requires justifiable, not reasonable, reliance.
And, finally,
once the creditor establishes fraud, Cohen extends the fraud
nondischargeability to punitive damages.'83 In each case, there were two
similar components; a debtor who committed fraud, with no attempt to
make amends for the damage caused, and a creditor, who upon
discovering the fraud, settled for nothing less than a full judgment on the
fraud.' 4 The Brown case provides the only departure from this standard,
in that the debtor did resolve the fraud liability issue with the creditor,
who voluntarily allowed
the debtor to pay an amount less than full
85
payment on the fraud.

III. ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court focused on the policy of protecting
innocent creditors against fraudulent debtors, the Court and other cases
reaching the same result based their refusal to discharge settlement debt
on a number of things. First, the courts found that the plain language of

176. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218-19 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 221.
178. Id. at 221-22.
179. Id. at 221.
180. See id. at 220-21; Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 73-75 (1995); Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1991).
181. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 291 (declaring the standard of proof for the
dischargeability exceptions to be the ordinary preponderance of evidence standard).
182. Field, 516 U.S. at 73-75.
183. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 220-21.
184. See id. at 215; Field, 516 U.S. at 62-63, 77; Grogan, 498 U.S. at 281, 291.
185. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979).
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section 523(a)(2)(A) dictates nondischargeability of such debts.186
Generally, the analysis ends with the plain language of a statute. 187
However, the courts bolster their conclusions with an analysis of88
legislative history, prior Supreme Court cases, and policy arguments.'
Regarding policy, the courts not only look to the protection policy noted
above, but also to the policy of encouraging settlement agreements over
litigation.'89
Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not provide clear and precise language on
the issue of discharge of settlement claims.' 9 Thus, the courts may
indeed consider legislative history, judicial history, and policy in
determining Congress' intent in enacting the statute. 91
Upon
consideration of each of these factors, it becomes obvious that permitting
discharge of settlement agreements entered into honestly can meet
Congress' objectives.
A. Plain Language of the Statute

Quite obviously, one should first consider section 523(a)(2)(A) in
determining whether to discharge a settlement debt of a fraud claim.""
However, the statute does not directly answer the question posed.' 93 It
merely refuses discharge for "any debt ...for money, property, services,
or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained
by-(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."' 94
Clearly a fraud judgment in state court meets the requirements of section
523(a)(2)(A), but what happens to a settlement debt?' 95 In Archer, the
Supreme Court indicated that, because the debt need only arise as a
result of money obtained by fraud, once fraud exists, any debt that
results from that fraud will become nondischargeable. 96 This conclusion,

186. See Radwan, supra note 10, at 998 n.34.
187.

See id.

188. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13; Radwan, supra note 10, at 998 n.34.
189. See, e.g., Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 390
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) ("On the other side, a plaintiff, naturally concerned about that
strategy, might be less willing to settle the tort claim. The law ought to facilitate
settlements, not obstruct them."); Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 236 (4th
Cir. 2002) (discussing cases "encouraging settlements," including Fischer, West, and
Maryland Casualty).

190.
191.

(1990);
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13 (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988)).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
See id.
Id.
See id.
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 322-23 (2003).
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said the Court, follows from the Court's previous decisions in the Brown
and Cohen cases." However, Cohen provides an entirely different set of
facts. ' 9' In Cohen, a fraud judgment existed; punitive damages provided
an additional punishment for the fraud. 99 Even if the debtor did not
fraudulently obtain the money due as punitive damages, the amount
became a debt to the creditor as a result of the fraud.2
Thus, even
following the Cohen interpretation of the statute to include all damages
directly linked to the original fraud claim does not automatically lead to
nondischargeability of a settlement replacing the fraud claim.01 In the
settlement scenario, the new debt replaces the old debt that would
otherwise be owed for the money obtained as a result of fraud, whether
or not such fraud even exists.202 Thus, the statute's interpretation could
easily allow for dischargeability in that the debtor owed the money as a
result of a contractual agreement, rather than through the fraud itself. In
fact, given that a debtor owes money under a settlement agreement even
if the creditor cannot show fraud, 0 it becomes even more obvious that
the debt arises from a contract, not from a debt obtained by fraud.
In another interesting twist on statutory interpretation, a number of
courts rely on embezzlement cases in determining whether to discharge
fraud liability.0 4
Maryland Casualty and Giaimo both involved

197. Id. at 320-22.
198. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 215-17 (1998).
199. Id. at 215-16.
200. Id. at 218-19.
201. See Cohen, 523 U.S. at 223. Of course, this does not create a situation allowing
discharge of only the original fraud debt owed by the debtor to the creditor. See id. For
example, although an embezzlement case, Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Covino provides a
situation where fairness requires nondischargeability of a contract debt based in a fraud
action. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Covino (In re Covino), 12 B.R. 876, 877 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1981). Covino embezzled money from his employer; the company received
reimbursement for its losses from the insurer, who then subrogated the company's claim
against Covino. Id. When Covino declared bankruptcy, he sought to discharge the debt
owed to the insurer, stating that the claim arose not out of nondischargeable
embezzlement, but out of a contract between the insurer and Covino's employer. Id. The
court disagreed and held the debt nondischargeable. Id. Even though the debtor did not
victimize the creditor, the amounts owed to the creditor resulted directly from the
embezzlement itself. Id. However, this case did not involve a situation where the creditor
and debtor agreed to replace the fraud claim with a contractual debt obligation. See id.
Rather, the debtor, if granted a discharge, would benefit by the fortuitous purchase of
insurance by his employer, at the expense of a creditor who agreed to pay the employer,
but did not release any claims against the debtor in the process. Id.
202. See AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 1 (2000) (stating that a settlement
"involves an agreement that a substituted performance is acceptable instead of what was
previously claimed to be due").
203. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 155 (11th Cir. 1983)
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Although not an embezzlement case, in Greenberg,the
embezzlement.
court based its analysis on an embezzlement case. 2°6 However, the
embezzlement statute at issue in Greenberg does not include the same
"to the extent obtained by" language used to deny discharge of debt
existing solely because of underlying fraud.2 7 Rather, the embezzlement
statute denies discharge only for that debt "for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny., 20 8 This
language appears to render the "to the extent" analysis engaged in by the
Cohen Court 209 unnecessary because the settlement could receive
discharge without such language.210
Looking beyond section 523(a)(2)(A), nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code prohibits changing the form of a fraud claim shortly before the
bankruptcy. 21 The provisions cited by the Francis court, which restrict
the ability for a debtor to waive either discharge or the right to file for
bankruptcy protection, focus on an entirely different policy than the
212
Section 523 denies discharge of fraud
section 523 denial of discharge.
213
debts in order to protect innocent creditors from dishonest debtors.
The two provisions noted by the Francis court focus on exactly the
opposite concern -protecting the unwitting debtor against unscrupulous
creditors. 214 Financially-savvy creditors may easily manipulate debtors on
the brink of financial ruin; less concern exists for creditors in their
relations with debtors.
Although Congress occasionally prohibits the changing of a claim
prebankruptcy in an attempt to protect creditors, it does so not to protect
the creditors involved in the transaction, but to protect remaining

205. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257, 258 (7th Cir. 1998); Giaimo v.
Detrano (In re Detrano), 266 B.R. 282, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
206. Greenberg,711 F.2d at 154-55.
207. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2000), with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2000).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2000).
209. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217-19 (1998).
210. See also Richardson v. Hidy Honda, Inc. (In re Richardson), 221 B.R. 956, 960 (D.
Wyo. 1998) (determining that "debt for" in the embezzlement statute means "debt as a
result of" embezzlement) (citing AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 709 (3d ed. 1992);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (6th ed. 1990)).
211. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
212. See Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 386, 388-90
(6th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), 727(a)(10) (2000)).
213. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
214. See Francis,226 B.R. at 386, 388-90; 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727(a)(10) (2000).
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216

A debtor
creditors.2" ' For example, consider preferential transfer law.
on the verge of filing for bankruptcy protection may wish to pay
preferred creditors to ensure that those creditors receive as much as
possible out of the debtor's limited assets. If that payment allows a
creditor to receive a greater amount than it would otherwise receive, a
preferential transfer may well exist, and the creditor must remit the
preference to the bankruptcy estate. 2 7 This provision protects not the
creditor who returned the preference, but the creditors who did not
receive the preference because more exists for distribution to all
creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. 8
The Code's "to the extent by" language located in section
523(a)(2)(A) provides little clarity as to congressional intent regarding
settlement debt on a fraud claim.1 9 Other subsections of section 523
likewise fail to shed light on this issue. Finally, other provisions of the
Code only provide means for protecting debtors, or for protecting
and,
innocent creditors against the actions of debtors and other creditors
221
thus, do not aid in the interpretation of section 523(a)(2)(A).
B. Legislative History
Unfortunately, Congress provided little legislative history to guide the
To the extent that debts cannot
analysis of section 523(a)(2)(A).2
receive discharge under section 523(a), Congress decided that "the
creditors' interest in recovering full payment of [such] debts
outweigh[s] the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start. 223 Exceptions
to discharge exist either to prevent dishonest debtors from avoiding
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000). Under § 547, a claim which is amended by the
debtor's prepetition changes may be converted back to the original claim. This ability to
recover preferential transfers is designed to protect the remaining creditors from depletion
of the estate before bankruptcy is filed. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 n.10

(1979)
216. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000) (a preference means a transfer of the debtor's assets
within the, usually, 90 days before bankruptcy for the benefit of a creditor that allows the
creditor to receive more than he otherwise would).
217. Id.
218. See id.

219. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000); see also supra notes 191-203.
220.
221.

See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000); see also supra notes 203-09.
See supra notes 211-17.

222. For a discussion of the legislative history, see 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) and
accompanying text.
223. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). See also Zelikoff, supra note 69 at
873-74 ("The purpose of the fraud exception is to discourage fraudulent conduct and to
ensure that dishonest debtors do not have the same relief as honest debtors. If the court
[held otherwise], this division of benefits between honest and dishonest debtors would no
longer exist.").
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24
debts.1
225 The fraud
debts, or to ensure payment of important types of• t..
.•
.
Thus, to
exception clearly fits into the former of these justifications.
to §
pursuant
to
a
creditor
discharge
denied
that
Congress
extent
the
creditors
victimized
to
protect
its
desire
indicates
523(a)(2)(A), Congress
226
against dishonest debtors.
In the cases at hand, however, the debtor may not be dishonest.
Certainly, the debtor engaged in dishonest behavior at one point in time,
but the Supreme Court's newest decision dictates that a dishonest debtor
can never become honest again, even if that debtor enters into a
the honest (and reasonable) intention of
settlement agreement with
227
repaying the debt in full.
The Brown Court considered the legislative history of section
523(a)(2)(A) or, more accurately, of its predecessor, section 17a of the
Bankruptcy Act. 228 The original version of the Act denied discharge only
for judgments of fraud, 229 but five years later, Congress changed it to
include liabilities for fraud.2 30 The Court then cited statements of
Congress regarding the statute, and reached the conclusion that such
statements required a finding of nondischargeability of any debt resulting
from fraud, even if not actually incurred fraudulently. 31To the extent that
the statute deleted the requirement of a fraud judgment for
nondischargeability, courts may interpret such a change in a number of
ways, absent a congressional statement regarding its intention. The
Brown Court implied that the change indicated that debtors could not
discharge consent judgments on proven fraud. That decision then carried
over into the Archer decision prohibiting discharge of settlement
agreements in the event of fraud.232
The domino effect may now continue to allow courts to consider fraud
in any bankruptcy claim, regardless of the form of that claim when

224. See Radwan, supra note 10, at 992 n.19 (distinguishing between debts
nondischargeable as matter of public policy versus debts nondischargeable due to debtor's
bad acts).
225. Capital City Bank v. Kroh (In re Kroh), 88 BR. 987, 992 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988)
(noting that the purpose of the fraud exception is "to discourage fraudulent conduct and

to ensure that the relief intended for the honest debtor does not inure to the benefit of the
dishonest" debtor).
226. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
227. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 320-23 (2003).
228. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979).
229. Id. at 138 (citing 30 Stat. 550).
230. Id. (citing 32 Stat. 798).
231. Id. The Brown Court stated: "The amendment, said the accompanying House
Report, was 'in the interest of justice and honest dealing and honest conduct,' and it was
intended 'to exclude beyond peradventure certain liabilities growing out of offenses
against good morals."' Id.
232.

See id.
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entering bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the legislative change could also
indicate a desire to hold nondischargeable fraud proven without the need
for a lawsuit, for example, because the debtor admitted to the fraud or
filed bankruptcy before the entry of a judgment on the merits of the
claim. These explanations serve the congressional purpose of punishing
dishonest debtors by requiring that debtors who commit fraud pay for
that fraud. The Brown Court even cited congressional statements
indicating that the change from requiring judgments to only requiring
liabilities on fraud prevented dishonest debtors from receiving
discharge .2' But to extend such a nondischargeability determination to a
debtor who honestly enters into a settlement agreement simply because
that debtor at one time committed fraud does not promote the same
congressional ideals and also stretches the interpretation of legislative
history beyond permissible boundaries.
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Cases considering discharge of settlement frequently cite the Brown
case for the proposition that a bankruptcy court may look to underlying
debt to determine dischargeability despite the fact that the parties could
have litigated the issue in a non-bankruptcy proceeding.3
These
decisions correctly state the holding of Brown: the principles of res
judicata generally do not apply to consent judgments (or settlement
agreements).2 ' Thus, any claim by the Warners in the Archer case that a
bankruptcy court cannot hear the fraud claim due to such principles
would fail.136 However, the court in Brown never considered whether the
creditor's claim arising from the consent judgment constituted a
contractual debt or a fraud debt. 237 Indeed, it seems odd to think of this
case in contract terms because Brown did not involve any contract. 238
True, the parties agreed to the judgment, but unlike a settlement, the
Court actually put forth an order-a judgment-noting the debtor's
liability for the judgment amount.239 However, the Archer case differs
233. Id., 442 at 128-29.
234. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 319-23 (2003); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v.
Francis (In re Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 391-92 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998); Citizens Ins. Co. v.
Williams, No. 93-CV-74258-DT, 1994 WL 930884 *3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994).
235. Brown, 442 U.S. at 138-39.
236. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 320-23. See also Clark, supra note 55, at 1603 (considering
the application of collateral estoppel to settlements or consent judgments); Cuevas, supra
note 54, at 24 (discussing the applicability of collateral estoppel in dischargeability
proceedings).
237. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1978).
238. See id. at 128. Rather, Brown was Felsen's guarantor of a bank loan to finance
automobile trading for Felsen's car dealership. Id.
239. Id. at 128.
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from the Brown case; in an Archer situation, no judgment exists, nor will
a judgment ever come into existence, short of allowing a bankruptcy
court to render one.24 One would face difficulty contending that the
settlement agreement does not constitute a contract.14
Thus, the
question in the Archer case became whether to reconstrue that contract
as a fraud debt. 242 No such question presented itself in Brown.24 ' Rather,
in Brown, a judgment debt existed; the bankruptcy court merely needed
to determine the nature of that judgment, whether it was fraud or not.244
Even if one follows the Brown reasoning to determine the result in a
case like Archer, such a result would be inconsistent with other Supreme
Court opinions in the fraud dischargeability arena and with the
congressional policy of allowing honest debtors the benefit of a
discharge. The Archer decision fails to follow the constructs of Grogan,
where the Court stated:
At the outset, we distinguish between the standard of proof that
a creditor must satisfy in order to establish a valid claim against
a bankrupt estate and the standard that a creditor who has
established a valid claim must still satisfy in order to avoid
dischargeability. The validity of a creditor's claim is determined
by rules of state law. .

.

. Since 1970, however, the issue of

nondischargeability has been a matter of federal law governed
by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code.2 45

The Grogan decision requires first a state law claim against the
bankruptcy estate, and a subsequent finding by the bankruptcy court
refusing discharge of the state law claim on the basis of fraud. 246

However, in the context of a settlement agreement, no state law fraud
claim exists. What exists? A state law contract claim. 24' By looking past
the state law contract principles to find any underlying fraud in
240.
241.

Compare Archer, 538 U.S. 314 (2003), with Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1978).
See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 37 (2000) ("A valid

compromise and settlement.., is as binding as any contract the parties could make ... .
242.

Archer, 538 U.S. at 318-19.

243. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1978).
244. See In re DeTrano, 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Where, however, the
judgment does not indicate the cause of action on which liability is based, res judicata does
not apply.... ") (citing Brown, 442 U.S. at 133-35).
245. Grogan v. Garner, 298 U.S. 279 at 283-84 (citing Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946)).
246.

See generally Grogan, 498 U.S. at 283-85 (distinguishing between state law

determination that a creditor holds a valid claim, and federal law determination that a
claim cannot be discharged due to fraud). See also Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Francis (In re
Francis), 226 B.R. 385, 395 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (Lundin, J., dissenting) (noting that the
decision allows a creditor to charge fraud despite voluntary release of a prior claim).
247.

15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 36 (2000) (stating that settlement

extinguishes prior claims, limiting parties to actions based on the agreement itself).
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determining dischargeability, the Archer court essentially created a state
law claim for fraud. Consider the disastrous ramifications of such a
decision. If a creditor sues a debtor for breach of contract but never
brings forth a fraud allegation, and the parties subsequently settle that
claim, the bankruptcy court may still determine that fraud existed and
hold the settlement debt nondischargeable because fraud is determined
separately from the contract claim. 248 This provides a great incentive for
creditors to allege fraud in every bankruptcy claim if not entirely
frivolous 2.4 9

However, the Grogan Court sought not to increase litigation, but to
avoid it)50 Grogan provided a lenient standard to creditors in proving
nondischargeability 25' to prevent those creditors from being forced to
relitigate an already-resolved issue in bankruptcy court. 252 The Grogan
decision provided a means for ensuring that a resolution of fraud
allegations in state court survives in bankruptcy.253 To allow a creditor to
use the Grogan decision to relitigate previously resolved issues in
bankruptcy court destroys the meaning of that decision.5
Furthermore, even if Grogan does allow a bankruptcy court to revisit a
claim decided by the state courts, as done in Brown,255 that does not mean
courts should reconsider fraud voluntarily abandoned by the parties.
The Grogan court repeatedly noted congressional intent to protect
251
victimized
fromliable
dishonest
debtors.
Grogan
involved a creditors
debtor found
for fraud
in court, 257Although
Archer, however,
248.

Res judicata might not even apply if the parties fail to settle and actually litigate

the issue because the issue would then involve dischargeability, not liability on the claim.
249. The Grogan Court noted this possibility, although it did not resolve what to do
with such a case. Grogan,498 U.S. at 285 n.12.
250. See id. at 282 n.4.
251. Id. at 285. The Court stated:
In sum, if nondischargeability must be proved only by a preponderance of the
evidence, all creditors who have secured fraud judgments, the elements of which
are the same as those of the fraud discharge exception, will be exempt from
discharge under collateral estoppel principles. If, however, nondischargeability
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, creditors who secured fraud
judgments based only on the preponderance standard would not be assured of
qualifying for the fraud discharge exception.
Id.
252. Id. at 284-85, 291 (holding that the applicable standard of proof for
dischargeability exceptions under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) is the preponderance of evidence
standard). Other factors influencing the Court's decision included the language of the
statute, its structure, and its legislative history. Id. at 286-87.
253. Id. at 284-85 & n.10.
254. See id. at 282 n.4, 284-85.
255. Roeder v. Brown (In re Brown), 162 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
256. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287-90.
257. Id. at 281.
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involved a creditor who, knowing of the possible existence of fraud,
chose not to continue pursuing a fraud claim and, instead, accepted a
contractual substitute. 2 8 The debtor did not victimize the Archer creditor
in creating the claim as the Grogan debtor did9
Finally, one could interpret the Cohen decision as refusing discharge of
any debt somehow resulting from a fraud.' 6° In some ways, such an
analysis mirrors a causation analysis, where causation-in-fact differs from
proximate causation. 261 Causation-in-fact requires only that the second
262
event would not exist "but-for" the first event, while proximate
causation requires a legally recognized connection between the two
261
proximate cause cannot exist without causation-inevents. 26' Further,264
6
0
In
fact, and intervening events may break the chain of causation.
Cohen, causation-in-fact certainly exists-punitive damages could not
266
exist against the landlord absent the original fraud against his tenants.
However, that same causation-in-fact may not exist in Archer. The
settlement agreement in Archer could exist even without fraud on the
part of the Warners; the underlying fraud claim need not be valid or
provable for the parties to enter into a settlement agreement.267 But even
if underlying fraud exists, the Archers broke that causal chain by
fraud
knowing26of
8 the underlying fraud and voluntarily terminating that
liability.
Prior Supreme Court decisions, then, do not provide a strong basis for
the Archer holding.2 9 The Brown decision misconstrues legislative
history to determine that nondischargeable fraud "liability" includes
270
liability so long as the creditor shows some fraud between the parties.
Furthermore, Brown's holding merely states that collateral estoppel and
res judicata principles do not apply to consent judgments, without
expressly stating that the bankruptcy court can or should revisit the basis

258. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 316-18 (2003).
259. Compareid., with Grogan, 498 U.S. at 281.
260. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213,218-19 (1998).
261. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(recognizing a the need to establish causation between fraud and debt). See also infra
notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2003).
263. Id. § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003).
264. Id. § 26 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2003).
265. Id. § 34 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003).
266. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 215 (1998).
267. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 327-28 (2003).
268. See id.; supra note 133.
269. Archer, 538 U.S. 327-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
270. See Roeder v. Brown (In re Brown), 162 B.R. 17, 18-20 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
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271

for a voluntary settlement agreement .
In addition, in the context of
settlement agreements, permitting such considerations by the bankruptcy
court undermines the purposes of the Grogan decision to avoid
relitigation of resolved issues. 72 Finally, the Cohen decision need not
apply in the context of claims resulting from voluntary agreement of the
273
parties.
1. Fearof Dishonest Debtors
The courts had expressed clear concern over the ability of a savvy
debtor to convert a nondischargeable fraud debt into a dischargeable
contract debt and, essentially, avoid payment on a fraud claim (or at least
avoid much payout on a fraud claim). 4 However, courts may render a
settlement debt nondischargeable to the extent that a debtor enters into
such an agreement just to turn the fraud payment into a contract claimwhich thus discharges it-even if the courts do not hold all fraud
settlements nondischargeable. 271 It certainly appears suspicious when the
debtor files for bankruptcy protection before making even one payment
276
on the settlement agreement.6
If the debtor's actions amount to bad
271. Id. at 19-20.
272. See supra notes 253, 255-57 and accompanying text.
273. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 215-16, 219 (1998) (recounting the
procedural history of the case and noting that the plaintiff contested the applicability of
§ 523 to certain damages, not any type of voluntary agreement).
274. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87, 290 (1991).
275. See, e.g., Ford v. Baroff (In re Baroff), 105 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1997) (awarding
a debtor attorney's fees in a nondischargeability action); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)
(2000) (prohibiting discharge of any debt obtained by fraud).
276. See In re Warner, 283 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2002). Proving fraudulent intent
presents challenges of its own. In Archer, the Fourth Circuit provided some guidance in
making such a claim:
any successful fraud-in-the-inducement contention must establish that Mrs.
Warner planned all along to file bankruptcy to escape her contractual settlement
commitments with the Archers. The district court doubted such a plan because
the Warners had ready [sic] paid $200,000 in cash pursuant to the settlement
agreement, and had given deeds of trust on real estate to secure the payment of
the note as well.
Id. Though the requirement of establishing fraudulent inducement of the settlement
agreement seems burdensome, keep in mind that this article discusses creditors who do
not yet hold a fraud judgment against a debtor. Even under the Archer analysis, the
creditor seeking an exception to discharge needs to establish fraud under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Id. at 235-36. Thus, this standard does not impose much of an additional
burden on a creditor seeking to render a debt nondischargeable; it merely changes the
form of fraud that the creditor must show. See id. Indeed, showing fraud in the
inducement of the settlement agreement may be easier to show if courts extend to
§ 523(a)(2)(A) the presumption found in another area of the Bankruptcy Code that a
debtor knows of his insolvency and pending bankruptcy during the months preceding
bankruptcy to § 523(a)(2)(A). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (2000). Rather than establishing that
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faith, the bankruptcy court has the authority to dismiss the bankruptcy
petition altogether. 2"' Because a debtor cannot receive a discharge
without successfully completing the bankruptcy, this remedy not only
prevents the debtor from discharging the settlement agreement entered
into dishonestly, but also punishes the debtor by preventing him from
discharging other debts obtained honestly. 27 8

As a result, consistent

application of such a tactic will deter future debtors from attempting the
same tricks in their own bankruptcy proceedings.
Even without complete dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding, if the
debtor entered into the settlement agreement fraudulently, such as by
intentionally misrepresenting his willingness or ability to repay the
settlement amount, the debtor cannot discharge damages caused by that
fraud. 79 If a creditor lost the ability to collect on the original fraud claim
by entering into the settlement and voluntarily waiving the fraud claim,
the damages would include the amount that the creditor could have
collected on the original fraud claim itself.28

Indeed, this may provide

the original transaction between the debtor and creditor resulted from fraud, the creditor
could show that the settlement transaction originated in fraud to establish
nondischargeability. The creditor may then need to show the viability of the original fraud
claim as well to establish damages. See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 237.
277. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a), 1112(b), 1307(c) (2000). See also Solow v. PPI Enters.,
Inc. (In re PPI Enters., Inc.), 324 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that bad faith
constitutes cause for dismissal of bankruptcy petition).
278. See PPI Enters., 324 F.3d at 210 (stating that bankruptcy courts have the power to
dismiss Chapter 11 filings for bad faith, thereby making the debtor responsible for all of
his debts).
279. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (exempting from discharge any money obtained
by misrepresentation).
280. But see In re Baroff, 105 F.3d 439. In Baroff, the debtor agreed to purchase a
Ford dealership from the creditors. Id. at 440. After some dispute over the financial
status of the companies, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, whereby the
debtor would pay the creditor $100,000 and obtain all rights to the dealership. Id. The
agreement expressly released all parties from "any future known or unknown claims." Id.
When the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, the creditor sought nondischargeability
of the settlement obligation on the basis of fraud. Id. However, the creditor alleged fraud
not in the underlying agreement to purchase the Ford dealership, but in the settlement
agreement itself. Id. The creditor argued that the debtor fraudulently induced it to enter
into the agreement. Id. Looking at California law, the court determined that the
agreement's language releasing the debtor from "all other" claims applied and, thus, the
fraudulent inducement claim could not continue. Id. at 442. In so holding, the court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that the settlement agreement's clear
language controlled, and that any extrinsic evidence to show the underlying fraud was
prohibited under California's parole evidence rule. Id. at 441. Although fraud provides
an exception to the parol evidence rule, a number of cases agree with Ford and provide
otherwise. Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest
Conduct, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 87, 110 (2001) (citing cases which hold that fraud is not an
exception to the parol evidence rule); Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and
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the creditor with even more protection than the Supreme Court
established in Archer because the creditor now holds a nondischargeable
claim limited not to the settlement amount, but to the value of the fraud
claim itself, because the misrepresentation on the settlement payment led
the creditor to give up its right to reap the benefit of the original fraud
claim.28 Such a solution responds to the concern of the Archer dissent,
which noted the difficulty in finding that the nondischargeable claim
arises out of the tort of fraud, while simultaneously holding
28 2 that the
amount of the claim finds its basis in the settlement contract.
2. The Essence of Settlement Agreements

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the fraud dischargeability
decisions involves the essence of settlement negotiations between parties.
Settlements provide a variety of benefits, and courts should certainly
encourage parties to use such agreements to resolve problems.
Although the Archer decision may encourage creditors to settle
agreements, 28428or at least not discourage settlement, it turns the general
understanding of settlements upside-down.

Interpretation:From the "Four Corners" to ParolEvidence (And Everything in Between),
69 Miss. L.J. 73, 269-73 (1999).
281. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2000). To the extent that the debtor makes
materially false written statements regarding his financial condition, the fraud also falls
under § 523(a)(2)(B), which expressly makes such statements nondischargeable if the
creditor relied upon them.
282. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323-28 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
283. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 5-6 (2000).
284. Archer, 538 U.S. at 323 (finding settlement debt arising out of "false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud" non-dischargeable even where the settlement
agreement "may have worked a kind of novation"). The concern of creditors' attorneys
becomes readily apparent in the advice given by them:
Where a creditor has been a victim of fraud, especially where the amount of the
loss is significant, that creditor should literally race to the courthouse to
commence, prosecute and obtain a final judgment before the defendant files
bankruptcy and should not compromise the fraud claim without a consent decree
attesting to the nondischargeability of the settlement obligation ....
A settlement structured against a backdrop where the creditor has gone through
the steps of obtaining a judgment under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code can then be structured as a simple forbearance agreement that will be
honored by the creditor only so long as the defendant/obligor makes the required
installment payments towards the agreed upon compromise amount.
Rebecca Callahan & Lisa Mathaisel, ContractingAround § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: Is
There an Iron-Clad Way To Create a Non-Dischargeable Settlement Obligation?, 45
ORANGE CouNTY LAW. 35, 41-42 (Apr. 2003). Other alternatives exist to the suggested
"trial and forbearance." Id. The parties can settle, but release claims only after payment
in full, or, perhaps, settle with the express proviso that the settlement will not be deemed a
contract in bankruptcy. This article does not suggest the enforceability of such a provision
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Parties enter into settlement agreements for a variety of reasons.286
Perhaps parties wish to avoid bringing forth embarrassing or sensitive
information in court. Perhaps they do not know the strength of their
respective cases and prefer the certainty of a settlement. Perhaps they
know the weaknesses of the case and expect to receive more in a
settlement than in a judgment. Perhaps they wish to speed up the
resolution by avoiding trial. Perhaps the creditor, aware of the debtor's
precarious financial position, deems it better to receive a paltry amount
in settlement than to allow the debtor to spend all of its resources
litigating a fraud claim and become unable to pay the judgment
thereon."" Regardless of the reasons for entering into a settlement, such
a settlement serves one primary purpose; it brings certainty to the

by the bankruptcy courts; the courts would need to determine if such a provision unduly
prevents the debtor from filing for bankruptcy protection in the first place. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2000) (rendering provisions based on bankruptcy or insolvency
unenforceable in executory contracts). However, if permitted, such a provision protects
creditors without foregoing settlement altogether and without the necessity of litigation.
285. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 322-23. How to best effectuate the policy of encouraging
settlements received much analysis in the courts considering the fraud dischargeability
issue. See supra notes 38-43, 70 and accompanying text. Creditors may avoid settlement if
the debtor could discharge such debt. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Debtors
who cannot discharge a settlement agreement upon a showing of fraud may not find any
benefit in settlement. See Brief for AARP, supra note 49, at 6. The latter rationale
received some well-deserved criticism in that the debtor loses little by settling. See id. If
the court denies discharge of the settlement amount because of a showing of fraud, the
debtor's position remains the same as if the debtor had litigated the claim, but the creditor
receives a judgment of fraud against the debtor, as well as a finding of nondischargeability
of the resulting fraud liability. To some extent, this ignores the fact that settlement costs
money, and if the debtor settles and subsequently must litigate the fraud issue in
bankruptcy court, it costs even more. However, courts probably will offer little sympathy
to the debtor entering into the settlement agreement with knowledge of a pending
bankruptcy filing.
286. 15A AM. JUR. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 6 (2000) (noting that parties
favor settlements because they are "faster and less expensive" than lawsuits and promote
"amicable and peaceful relations" between litigants).
287. The Brown Court noted this possibility:
So long as a debtor is solvent, the debtor and creditor alike may prefer a simple
contract suit to complex tort litigation. Default and consent judgments are
common in collection proceedings. For the creditor, the prospect of increased
attorney's fees and the likelihood of driving the debtor into bankruptcy may
offset the advantages of exemplary damages or other extraordinary remedies.
Bankruptcy deprives the debtor of his creditworthiness and so impairs his ability
to repay. In the words of a Shakespearean creditor, fearing the worst: "When
every feather sticks in his own wing, Which Lord Timon will be left a naked Gull,
Which flashes now a Phoenix."
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 137 n.8 (1979) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Timon
of Athens, Act 2, Sc. 1).
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otherwise unpredictable world of litigation.28 Ultimately, the parties
"agree[] that a substituted performance is acceptable instead of what was
previously claimed to be due; thus, each party yields something and
agrees to eliminate both the hope of gaining as much as he previously
claimed and the risk of losing as much as the other party previously
claimed. 2 89 At the heart of settlement lies the willingness of each party

to give up something, such as a right to more money or, perhaps, a claim
of nondischargeability,
in exchange for something else, such as
29
certainty. 0
Settlement agreements arise in contract, 29' and enforcement requires
292
meeting the required elements of a contract.
Assuming that the parties
288. By "unpredictable," the author does not intend to imply that the judicial process
creates flawed or unfair results. Even with a perfectly-conducted trial, one cannot always
predict the decision of a jury or judge. Cf R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and
Negligence: The View from the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1993) (arguing that
because jury verdicts rely on the composition of the jury, settlements tend to create more
fair results).
289. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 1 (2000).
290. See id. at § 29 (arguing that a settlement agreement must include "mutual
concessions").
291. Id. § 9. Because settlement agreements exist as contracts, another issue that
periodically arises involves whether the settlement agreement constitutes an executory
contract subject to § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 229-31, 249-50 (1989).
Executory contracts include those contracts on which some performance remains due
from each party to the contract, though many interpretations of "some performance"
exist. Id. at 236-37, 243. For each settlement agreement, the court must consider the facts
of the case to determine the application of executory contract law. See Enter. Energy
Corp. v. United States, 50 F.3d 233, 238, 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that a prepetition
settlement agreement between debtor and creditor was not an executory contract); Jenson
v. Cont'l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 1979) (concluding that a settlement
agreement between debtor and creditor was an executory contract). The decision to apply
executory contract law adds yet another layer of decision-making for the court because the
trustee or debtor-in-possession has the exclusive right to choose whether to continue
under the terms of the contract, subject to the court's approval of that choice. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 365(a), 1107(a) (2000). If the debtor chooses to continue under the terms of the
contract, the dischargeability question becomes moot because the parties must comply
with the contract in all respects. See A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The
Evolving Nature of Property of the Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 305 n.107 (1999)
(discussing debtor's obligations in an assumed executory contract). In choosing not to
continue under the terms of the contract, however, the debtor and creditor may find
themselves considering the implications of the Archer decision, for rejection of a contract
constitutes breach of the contract, creating a claim against the bankruptcy estate. 11
U.S.C. § 365(g) (2000). In some sense, the Archer decision may render the debtor's choice
somewhat less important; in either assumption or rejection, the debtor will remain
indefinitely liable for the amounts due under the settlement agreement.
292. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 10 (2000). These elements
include: offer, acceptance, consideration, and "mutual assent." Id. Another possible
argument for a creditor trying to avoid discharge of settlement obligations may stem from
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included all these elements and agreed to all essential terms in the
contract:
A valid compromise and settlement is final, conclusive, and
binding upon the parties and upon those who knowingly accept
its benefit. It is as binding as any contract the parties could
make, and as binding as if its terms were embodied in a
judgment. A compromise and settlement generally is binding
upon the parties although it resolves a controversy differently
from what the court would have decided if the controversy had
been brought before it for decision .

293
9

In some sense, by entering into a settlement agreement, parties create
their own res judicata and claim preclusion, thus dictating their own
resolution of the fraud issue.
Of course, not every settlement agreement involves an agreement
between the parties to substitute the settlement contract for the original
tort claim. Courts allowing discharge of a settlement agreement focus on
the existence of such a release of the debtor within a settlement
Without such a release, courts typically find that the
agreement.9
debtor's liability for fraud under state law continues.295 If state law fraud
the mutual assent requirement. See id. § 11 ("A valid compromise requires the mutual
assent of the parties, and a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms of the
agreement."). Assuming that the dischargeability of the debt in the event of a bankruptcy
constitutes an essential term of the settlement agreement, the failure of the parties to
agree on such dischargeability would indicate a lack of mutual assent between the parties.
See id. §§ 11, 39; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.1 (2d ed.
1998). Without such assent, a court cannot enforce the settlement agreement. See 15A
AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 10, 39 (2000). Thus, because of the absence of
a contract in the form of a settlement between the parties, the creditor is able to bring
forth the original fraud claim. See id. §§ 11, 39.
293. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 37 (2000).
294. See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1554-55 (3d
Cir. 1994).
295. Even this issue, however, creates controversy. In some situations, the debtor
alleges mere oversight in the omission of release language with regard to a particular debt,
or that the language that the parties used as a release included all claims. Courts disagree
in such circumstances. When release language exists, but merely neglects to include one
or more claims against the debtor, some courts look to the language of the contract and
refuse to release the excluded claim. See, e.g., Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d
1186, 1199-1202 (10th Cir. 1998). Others look to the intent of the parties to determine
whether a reasonable person would expect release of the additional causes of action.
Main Line Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 298 F.2d 801, 803 (3d Cir.
1962). The Third Circuit took the Main Line decision one step further, declaring that the
release automatically operates to release all other claims because the settlement
agreement itself acts as a final judgment in the lawsuit, invoking res judicata-like
principles. See Grimes, 17 F.3d at 1553. The Main Line court even went so far as to hold
that, even where the parties have only an agreement to dismiss the pending lawsuit
without an express release of claims, that a release exists because, "a reasonable person
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liability exists, courts cannot discharge it against the creditor's wishes
under bankruptcy law.296 Courts frequently use the term "novation" to
describe the release of claims, although technically a novation involves
the substitution of one party for another within a contract.297
Agreements may instead withhold release of the original claim until full
payment of the settlement amount. 29s As such, creditors may protect
themselves from dischargeability; by using such a provision, nothing
limits the creditor to receiving only the contracted-upon amount of the
claim. To the extent not paid in full, the creditor may pursue the original
fraud claim and collect the corresponding damages.299
However, the situation at hand involves a release. The creditor
foregoes the ability to later claim fraud in exchange for a sum certain.
The debtor gives up that sum certain in exchange for relief from the
fraud allegations. These negotiations indicate a clear intent of the parties
to avoid litigation of the underlying tort claim. Unfortunately, these
agreements rarely indicate the intent of the parties if a bankruptcy later
ensues. Thus:
The primary issue, then, is not a matter of "freedom to enter
into settlement agreements" as posited by the Warner majority
Rather, the issue is faithful interpretation of
[Circuit Court] ....
contractual intent. When the parties make no specific mention
of bankruptcy or dischargeability issues in a general release of
claims, is the more realistic presumption that the parties did or
did not intend to release any claim of nondischargeability in the
agreeing, without any expression of limitation, to accept a sum in settlement of the
litigation should and reasonably would understand that both aspects of the suit were
Main Line, 298 F.2d at 803. Under the Archer decision,
covered by the settlement ....
this line of cases becomes irrelevant for, regardless of what the parties release, the courts
can consider the fraud. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 318-320 (2003).
296. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 323-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297. See supra note 42. To some extent, the use of the term "novation" in describing
the effect of a settlement agreement makes sense; the "compromise or settlement often
will have the same effects as a novation or release." 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and
Settlement § 3 (2000).
298. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 48 (2000). Section 48 states:
A compromise agreement may be classified either as an "executory accord,"
where it operates as a satisfaction of an antecedent claim only when performed,
or as a "substituted contract," where it operates as an immediate substitution for
and extinguishment of an antecedent claim. Such distinction may be important
where a compromise agreement is not fully performed, because the remedies for
breach of an executory accord may differ from the remedies for breach of a
substituted contract. The parties' intention generally may determine whether a
compromise agreement has the effect of an executory accord or a substituted
contract ....
Id.
299. See id.
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fails to pay the agreed settlement
event that
3 ° the debtor
amount? 0

The issue becomes assuming what the parties intended in the event of
bankruptcy, and determining whether the parties can rebut that
determination through language in the settlement agreement. 1 In
Archer, the Court did not discuss the intent of the parties, but instead
32
determined that congressional intent led to a denial of dischargeability.
As noted, congressional intent provides little in the way of definitive
answers to this problem.
Starting with the primary concern of Congress and the courts-the
protection of innocent creditors against dishonest debtors-leads
naturally to a conclusion that the intent of the parties should reign in
determining dischargeability of settlement debt.33 If a defrauded
creditor contractually allows discharge of an otherwise nondischargeable
claim, nothing in the Code should interfere. 3°4
The next concern becomes whether to presume that, in the absence of
language dictating the dischargeability of a debt, a settlement agreement
operates as a waiver of nondischargeability of the underlying fraud claim.
As already noted, parties to a settlement agreement expect that, in
releasing underlying fraud claims, they will never need to litigate the
A presumption that the creditor who waives
issue of fraud.305
nondischargeability in a settlement agreement also waives liability for
fraud comports with such an understanding. A contrary presumption
forces parties to litigate whether fraud occurred.3° . Although the
300. Contractual Settlement Agreements as to the Dischargeability of the Settlement
Debt, BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER (West Group), June 2002, at 8.
301. See, e.g., Schuylkill Skyport Inn, Inc. v. Rich, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, *25-26
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
302. See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321-22 (2003).
303. See BANKRUPTCY LAW LETrER, supra note 300, at 8 (arguing that courts should
focus on "discerning the intent of the contracting parties in entering into the settlement
and release," and noting that a creditor must be permitted to contractually abandon its
right to nondischargeability of fraud debt).
304. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 326-27 & n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that
creditors may waive claims of nondischargeability). But see Bank of China v. Huang (In re
Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2002) (declaring that debtors may not waive the
right to dischargeability prior to filing a bankruptcy petition).
305. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 315.
306. The new litigation presents other problems because it occurs in a different court
than the parties originally contemplated. In Bankruptcy Court, the burden of proof for
fraud claims may differ from that in other courts. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 287,
287-88 (1991). In addition, although bankruptcy courts may conduct jury trials pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (2000), they rarely do so. See generally G. Ray Warner, Katchen Up in
Bankruptcy: The New Jury Trial Right, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1, 2 (1989) (arguing that
right to trial by jury should be identical in bankruptcy court and state court). By filing a
proof of claim as required in either a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case (or a Chapter 11 case if
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litigation serves the purpose of determining dischargeability, it still
creates essentially the same litigation and uncertainty that the parties
sought to avoid by the original settlement agreement. Thus, if the parties
intended to avoid a determination of the existence of fraud, the courts
should also presume that the parties intended to avoid a determination of
the existence of fraud as the basis of nondischargeability. Parties should
be able to rebut such a presumption; courts should allow the creditor to
bring forth evidence that the parties intended the settlement agreement
to create a contract debt only as to a determination of fraud liability, not
as to a determination of dischargeability, thus permiting the court to
determine the consequences of such intent.
3. Effect on Debtors and Creditors
Consider again our three debtors, Adam, Brian, and Chris. Under the
Archer analysis, each situation results in a nondischargeable claim, in the
amount of $50,000 (the remainder due under the settlement agreement),
less any amounts paid through the bankruptcy proceeding. A creditor
with a settlement agreement differs from a creditor with a fraud claim in
that the former realizes the extent of the fraud and chooses to abandon
that claim in favor of a contract. Nonetheless, the Archer Court treats
these types of creditors in an identical manner in rendering the debt
nondischargeable upon a showing of fraud.
Adam entered into the settlement agreement misrepresenting his
willingness and ability to pay the agreed-upon amounts, and receiving an
express release of his liability for fraud regarding the sale of his business.
Under the analysis presented herein, Adam would receive a discharge of
the $50,000 still due under the settlement agreement, a contract debt.
However, Adam clearly represents the dishonest debtor.
What
protection, then, does the creditor enjoy? The creditor still enjoys the
ability to receive a nondischargeable fraud claim against Adam. The
claim exists pursuant to the settlement agreement that Adam
fraudulently induced the creditor to enter into, rather than pursuant to
the sale agreement which the parties already settled.
Next, what damages should the creditor receive? The existence of the
settlement agreement and, more specifically, the release located therein,
the scheduled claim amount is disputed) pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002, the creditor

submits to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and gives up the right to a jury trial.
NORTON, supra note 17, at § 4:138 (citing Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990), reh'g
denied, 498 U.S. 1043 (1991)). In addition, dischargeability proceedings constitute
equitable actions in bankruptcy, which typically do not invoke a right to jury trial.
NORTON, supra note 17, at § 4:138 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33
(1989)) ("The creditor is thus faced with a Hobson's choice of either foregoing
distributions on its claim or waiving a right to a trial by jury on the claim of the debtor or
trustee.").

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:81

prevented the creditor from bringing forth a fraud claim against Adam
and from receiving the damages available under state law as a result of
that fraud claim. The creditor, therefore, should receive the lost
damages as compensation for Adam's fraud regarding the settlement
agreement. Thus, the creditor receives not only the settlement amount,
the limit of the damages under the Archer analysis, but the full amount
due under the original fraud claim!
Next, consider Brian. Like Adam, Brian received a release of the
alleged fraud in the sale of his business. However, unlike Adam, Brian
entered into the settlement agreement with the full intent to repay the
settlement amount. Will the remainder due under the settlement
agreement receive a discharge? The intent of the parties reigns. But,
without an express indication of that intent within the contract, the
courts must determine that intent. By presuming (absent evidence to the
contrary) that the parties intend the natural consequences of the
contract-discharge-upon releasing the underlying fraud, Brian
receives a discharge of the amount due under the settlement agreement.
Of course, this harms the creditor who will never receive anything more.
But this creditor voluntarily released Brian from his fraud liability
knowing full well of Brian's alleged fraud. The creditor chose to settle
the case for whatever reason and expressly gave up the ability to claim
fraud later. Congress need not protect a creditor with such knowledge.
Finally, consider Chris, who entered into the settlement agreement
honestly, but failed to secure a release from the underlying fraud. Chris's
failure to pay the settlement amount renders Chris liable for the
underlying fraud.3°7 This mirrors the intent of the parties in entering into
the settlement agreement because the fraud persists as a viable claim
until full payment of the settlement amount. As with Adam, the creditor
may receive a judgment for damages caused by the fraud in the original
sale agreement. Unlike Adam, however, these damages result directly
from that original fraud, rather than from fraud in the subsequent
settlement agreement.
307. A question unanswered at this time, but certainly worth discussion, asks whether
the payment of a portion of the settlement through a bankruptcy constitutes payment in
full of a claim. If so, Chris performed fully under the contract, leaving his creditor with no
ability to seek damages on account of the fraud, even though the settlement agreement
release did not take effect immediately upon the signing of the settlement agreement.
Given that the parties' agreement protects the creditor until full payment of the settlement
amount, to effectuate the intent of the parties requires holding Chris liable for the unpaid
amounts under the settlement agreement. This comports with § 524(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which renders a creditor unable to sue for amounts claimed in the bankruptcy. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000). Because the contract served as the basis for the claim in
bankruptcy, but fraud serves as the claim in the subsequent action, the creditor's action
does not constitute a post-bankruptcy attempt to collect debt discharged in the
bankruptcy.

2003]

Domino Effect

As these three hypothetical debtors illustrate, debtors who attempt to
resolve a prior dishonesty through settlement lose the most in the Archer
analysis and gain the most by the analysis proposed herein, which focuses
on presumptions regarding the intent of the parties, and alternative
means of punishing dishonest debtors and protecting victimized
creditors. If Congress intends to provide discharge for honest debtors,
Brian should fall within that category as soon as he makes honest amends
for any prior infractions. Creditors who deal with dishonest debtors like
Adam still receive such protection under the fraud nondischargeability
provisions. As for Chris, this analysis would inevitably lead to a keener
awareness on the part of debtors and creditors as to the effects of
settlement of fraud claims in bankruptcy proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION

As noted by the Archer dissent, one odd aspect of the Archer decision
involved the lack of a link between the evidence presented and the
damages sought as nondischargeable. 0 8 Once the creditor shows fraud,
and the debtor becomes forever liable as a result, why limit the damages
to something less than the damages caused by that fraud? To do so
essentially admits that the parties entered into a binding contractual
settlement, without giving that settlement its full effect.
Parties enter into settlement agreements to provide certainty.0 9 Each
party accepts the payment of a sum certain to avoid the risks of litigation,
the time of litigation, and the expense of litigation. 310 The Archer
decision removes these burdens, and forces the parties to litigate the very
issues they avoided by the settlement-simply to determine whether the
amounts due under the settlement should continue to exist. Thus,
though the parties will essentially engage in the same litigation as if no
settlement occurred, the object of the litigation changes dramatically. In
this instance, the maximum recovery becomes the settled-upon amount,
not the fraud damages, and the minimum recovery becomes the amount
already paid under the settlement agreement, rather than nothing. This
odd situation arises because the courts essentially straddle the line
between tort and contract, allowing the tort claim while still enforcing
the contract. In so doing, the courts fail to consider the realities of
settlement and the desire of the parties to avoid litigation. Courts need
not abandon the parties' intent simply to protect those creditors
victimized by a dishonest debtor who enters into a settlement akreement
simply to change fraud debt into dischargeable contract debt. The use of
308. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 323-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
309. See supra note 289.
310. See supra note 289.
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bad-faith filing or fraud claims in the creation of the settlement
agreement protects the creditor victimized by such a debtor, while
allowing more honest debtors the benefit of discharge.

